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that stress tests become more important, not less, in the midst of systemic distress, 
but only if the stress scenarios are modified to reflect the distinct challenges an 
economy is facing. Well-designed stress tests can provide critical information to 
policy makers and others, promoting more timely efforts to address underlying 
weaknesses. Given that regulators will rationally be hesitant to produce, much 
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seeking to contain, crisis-time stress testing is only viable if regulators also have 
the tools needed to address any bad news the testing may reveal.
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Stress Testing During Times of War  
Kathryn Judge* 
 
The Covid crisis raises important questions about the role of stress testing during periods of 
systemic distress. Should stress testing of banks be abandoned? Modified? Proceed as scheduled? 
Different jurisdictions have taken different tacks, reflecting contestation over these fundamental 
issues. This essay argues that stress tests become more important, not less, in the midst of systemic 
distress, but only if the stress scenarios are modified to reflect the distinct challenges an economy 
is facing. Well-designed stress tests can provide critical information to policy makers and others, 
promoting more timely efforts to address underlying weaknesses. Given that regulators will 
rationally be hesitant to produce, much less disclose, information that could exacerbate the very 
crisis regulators are seeking to contain, crisis-time stress testing is only viable if regulators also 
have the tools needed to address any bad news the testing may reveal.  
 
Introduction 
In the spring of 2009, the United States was mired in the greatest recession it had 
faced since the Great Depression.  In March, the Dow Jones Industrial average had fallen 
to 6,594.44, a total decline of 53.4 percent from its peak in the fall of 2007.  The official 
unemployment rate was over nine percent and still trending upward, eventually to exceed 
ten percent.  With the support of Congress, the Federal Reserve and other financial 
regulators had launched an array of initiatives to contain the fallout of what had become 
a global financial crisis.  These interventions, including a massive recapitalization of U.S. 
banks and the effective elimination of large, independent investment banks, had 
succeeded in stabilizing much of the financial system, but full functionality remained 
elusive.  The crisis had revealed significant deficiencies in the banks’ risk management 
systems and the capacity of regulators to detect those weaknesses.  Fear and distrust 
remained the order of the day. 
Against this background, the Federal Reserve and other bank regulators took a 
gamble.  On May 7, 2009, they publicly announced the results of the Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program (SCAP).  As then-Chairman Ben Bernanke explains, “the SCAP 
marked the first time the U.S. bank regulatory agencies had conducted a supervisory 
stress test simultaneously across the largest banking firms.”1  The Fed further deviated 
from tradition in its decision to disclose the results of the SCAP.  In providing an 
unprecedented level of detail regarding the methodology and inputs used in reaching 
those results, the Fed challenged the assumption that bank supervision should always be 
shrouded behind a thick veil of secrecy.  Both gambles paid off.  As Bernanke later 
observed: “The SCAP stands out … as one of the critical turning points in the financial 	
* Harvey J. Goldschmid Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, ECGI Research Member. The 
author would like to thank the editors of the Stress Test Handbook, Til Schuermann, Doyne 
Farmer, Alissa Kleinnijenhuis and Thom Wetzer, Nat Benjamin, and other participants of the 
IMF’s Conference on Rethinking Financial Stability for thoughtful feedback on earlier versions of 
this chapter. 
1 Bernanke, Stress Testing Banks: What Have We Learned? (2013). 
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crisis. It provided anxious investors with something they craved: credible information 
about prospective losses at banks.”2  
Most policymakers, academics, and industry participants share Bernanke’s 
positive assessment of the SCAP.  Stress tests have now become a core part of the 
supervisory and regulatory toolkit, and one of the most important post-crisis regulatory 
innovations. The Dodd–Frank Act requires large banking organizations to undergo stress 
tests, and regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have come to see stress testing as a 
critical component of their ongoing efforts to prevent another financial crisis.  These 
successes have been sufficiently great that other regulators too have embraced stress 
testing. There are even proposals for yet other ways that stress testing may be used to 
detect weaknesses in the financial system before they threaten the health or stability of 
that system.  (See, for example, Thurner & Poledna and Farmer et al in this Handbook]) 
These are important developments, and broad-based, regular stress testing is 
appropriately here to stay.  These post-crisis developments, however, have shifted 
attention away from the distinct value, and risks, of the SCAP as a crisis-time 
intervention. 
This Chapter shifts the focus back to crisis-era stress testing and other modes of 
just-in-time information production.  Even with rigorous stress testing, the complexity 
and dynamism of the financial markets are such that regulators will always have 
incomplete information.  These information gaps can prove particularly problematic 
during periods of distress.  A lack of information can contribute to regulators’ tendency to 
be too slow to recognize problems, exacerbating the size of a crisis and the long-term 
macroeconomic effects.  Information gaps can also impede crisis containment efforts once 
a crisis takes hold.  Without accurate information about the size and location of capital 
and liquidity shortages, regulators often have little choice but to over-supply or mis-shoot 
in their efforts to combat dysfunction.  This can exacerbate moral hazard and public 
outrage, as large sums of taxpayer money seem to flow to the very financial institutions 
that are perceived to be the cause of the crisis. 
The Covid-19 crisis has made these issues timely in new ways. Unlike 2008, the 
Covid-19 crisis grows out of changes to the real economy. The public health threat posed 
by the novel coronavirus coupled with policy changes designed to slow its spread caused 
massive, unanticipated changes to virtually every corner of the economy and society. 
Thanks in significant part to quick and aggressive actions by the Federal Reserve, boosted 
by aid from Congress, the early panic triggered by Covid-19 was quelled and the 
reckoning going on in the real economy has not yet triggered a full-blown financial crisis. 
But it is far too early to declare victory. This essay pulls on lessons from past crises and 
expert analyses of when and how stress testing can aid supervision to explain the distinct 
value of crisis-time stress tests. 
This chapter argues that stress tests can play a critical role in crisis containment, 
and more should be done in advance to enable crisis-time stress testing.  Once things 
have started to go awry, stress testing provides an array of benefits. When fault lines 
emerge, regulators have a much clearer sense of the type of adverse developments that 
may threaten stability, where weaknesses may lie, and the specific fears that they must 	
2 Id. 
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address to restore market functioning.  Stress tests can provide much needed information 
about the size and location of fundamental weaknesses in the system and the mechanisms 
through which those weaknesses may trigger broader dysfunction.  Moreover, as the 
SCAP demonstrated, producing credible information and using that information to shape 
substantive policy interventions, like recapitalizations, can reduce the relative size of the 
amount of government support needed to restore faith and functionality.   
The analysis here rests on the assumption that crises are in part information 
events.  Coordination challenges may exacerbate dysfunction, but runs are rare when the 
entire financial system is safe and sound, and everyone has credible information that it is 
so.  Fragility, that is, dysfunction out of proportion to the triggering event, is in part the 
result of incomplete information about the ramifications or meaning of an adverse 
development.  Stress tests can help address the unknowns that exacerbate fragility while 
providing guidance about how best to deploy other tools, like guarantees and capital 
injections, that may be needed to calm fears and restore health. Even if these dynamics 
are not yet on full display with Covid-19, they may yet prove troubling.  
Recognizing the importance of crisis-era information production reveals critical 
shortcomings in the current toolset policymakers have at their disposal.  Most 
importantly, regulators will hesitate to tread into the unknown and generate new 
information when doing so could destabilize an already fragile system.  Without the 
passage of Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which empowered the Treasury to 
recapitalize weak banks if needed, regulators may well have lacked the will to take on the 
risks that the SCAP entailed. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act passed by Congress in March 2020, provides a much bigger fiscal hit for 
the economy, but less discretion to regulators. Whether it will suffice as a backstop should 
panic set in remains to be seen.   
Going forward, devising ways to vest regulators with the authority needed to 
contain, even if not resolve, a large-scale crisis is critical if we want regulators to produce 
the information required to reduce the size and scope of the next crisis.  Time-limited 
guarantee authority, which I have advocated for elsewhere, is one to encourage regulators 
to probe into the unknown when the system next starts to gyrate.  There may well be 
others.    
This chapter proceeds in three parts.  The first part provides background.  It 
briefly reviews, in informational terms, how the SCAP contributed to the crisis recovery, 
why information production is likely to remain important during periods of systemic 
distress, and the challenge of isolating information production from substantive 
interventions.  The second part shifts the focus from the SCAP to consider the conditions 
under which just-in-time information production can aid crisis containment.  It expands 
the analysis temporally--to other stages in a crisis--and topically--to domains other than 
banks. The third and final part addresses the groundwork needed to aid crisis-era 
information generation, while recognizing that some improvisation is likely inevitable. It 
addresses the current situation but also the types of regulatory changes more broadly that 
may be warranted to promote just-in-time stress testing,  
The most significant challenge moving forward lies in honing the relationship 
between the production of information and the capacity to address any weaknesses the 
analysis reveals. There is no easy way to resolve this tension. In a democratic system, 
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fiscal decisions are usually reserved to the legislative branch or other elected officials, but 
these bodies are rarely equipped to act with the speed required to contain a growing 
financial crisis.  In the United States, for example, it may well have been difficult to get 
Congress to act without the massive fallout triggered by the failure of Lehman Brothers, 
and even with that, it was not easy.  Institutionalizing a guarantor of last resort is one way 
to bridge this gap, as it would allow regulators to act swiftly to contain a crisis while still 
reserving to the legislature the question of which banks should be recapitalized and on 
what terms. In this way, it could provide regulators both the incentive and capacity to 
generate information about the risks they are seeking to contain.  
I. Information  
A. The SCAP 
The SCAP was a critical turning point in resolving the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
The first round of stress tests provided high-quality information about the health of major 
financial institutions at a time when the lack of reliable information was continuing to 
impede market functioning.  Subsequent analysis shows that the market already had a 
good sense of which banks were undercapitalized, but there was uncertainty about the 
degree of undercapitalization.  (Peristani et al., 2010).  By using a standardized approach 
across the nineteen financial institutions involved and providing market participants 
sufficiently detailed information that they could use to assess the credibility for 
themselves, the SCAP helped address lingering uncertainty about the health of major 
banks and their capacity to support the financial system.  It also helped that the stress tests 
showed that the banking sector, as a whole, was healthier than expected.   
Examining the success of the SCAP provides a foundation for considering the 
conditions required for information injections to aid crisis containment.  Against this 
background, one factor distinguishing crisis era stress tests from tests conducted under less 
adverse conditions is the nature of the assumptions market participants are using to 
address the inevitable gaps in the information they have about the health of one another 
and other macroeconomic factors that might affect their willingness to engage in risk 
sharing and other activities.  At the time of the SCAP, banks and other market 
participants remained hesitant to work with one another in ways that were impeding the 
recovery.   
Throughout the year and a half between the start of the crisis and SCAP, 
regulators and market participants had frequently been behind the ball.  For the first year 
of the crisis, many regulators had underestimated and downplayed the scale of the 
problems plaguing the financial system.  Banks, meanwhile, continued to pay dividends 
and were slow to recognize losses or to set aside adequate reserves for bad loans and 
mortgage-backed-security-related liabilities (MBS), all while purporting to be well 
capitalized.  
Information, or rather lack thereof, contributed to regulators’ delayed recognition 
of the magnitude of the crisis they were facing. (Judge, 2017). Among the challenges was 
that the crisis emanated initially not in banks, subject to prudential oversight, but rather 
from the “shadow banking system”—a market-based system of intermediation that was 
similar in size and even more complicated in scope than the formal banking sector.  
Although regulators were aware of many of the pieces of this system, and the system was 
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closely interconnected at various points with banks subject to their oversight, its role in 
maturity and liquidity transformation, and its corresponding exposure to the risks that 
come along with such activity, was not fully appreciated by anyone before the crisis 
struck.  As Richard Clarida, now Vice Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve, has observed: “It would seem that the supervision and regulation of US 
investment and commercial banks during the great moderation was based on an 
assumption about how the financial system was supposed to work, not upon sufficient 
knowledge about how the financial system actually worked.”3  Thus, a combination of 
insufficient information and a tendency to view the information available through an 
outdated lens seems to have contributed to the delayed recognition of just how bad things 
might get.   
Eventually, as usually happens, problems that arose outside the banking sector 
made their way onto bank balance sheets. More than a year passed between when the 
crisis first hit and Lehman Brothers failed, during which time there were a series of 
adverse developments, including the failure of Bear Stearns, that made it clear that the 
situation remained fragile.  Nonetheless, it was not until the failure of Lehman Brothers, 
that Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), giving Treasury 
broad, new authority to stabilize the growing crisis.   
Treasury soon put that new authority to good use, although not in the way 
originally envisioned in EESA.  According to a GAO Report issued in January 2009, 
before the SCAP, Treasury had already deployed $294 billion of the funds it was 
authorized to use pursuant to EESA, with the bulk of that money going into banks 
pursuant to the Capital Purchase Program.  (GAO, 2009).  The FDIC had also issued 
guarantees on a range of debt instruments far beyond those that would normally be 
eligible for FDIC insurance.  Thus, by the time of the SCAP, the situation had already 
improved markedly, but only because of this series of broad, risky, and politically 
unpopular government interventions. 
Moreover, despite these myriad interventions, all was not necessarily well in the 
financial system.  Market participants continued to distrust banks’ internal risk 
management capacities and questions lingered regarding how the system as a whole 
might fare in the face of a further adverse shock.  It was at this time and in this 
environment that the SCAP, which both recapitalized the banks that needed it and 
allowed market participants to evaluate for themselves the accuracy of regulatory 
assessments of how much capital banks needed, proved so useful.   
B. Some implications  
Although it can be dangerous to extrapolate from a single example, the SCAP 
does suggest a couple of lessons.  One thing to note is that the environment into which the 
results of the SCAP were released shaped their impact on market functioning.  At the 
time of the SCAP, fear and distrust remained the default positions of many market 
participants.  The proxies on which market participants had been relying pre-crisis, from 
credit ratings to faith in supervisors or their own capacity to assess the risk of other 
institutions, had proved wanting.  As a result, the default level of market discipline was 	
3 Clarida, “What Has – and Has Not – Been Learned about Monetary Policy in a Low Inflation 
Environment? A Review of the 2000s” at 9 (2010).  
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excessively harsh relative to the actual health of banking organizations.  The credible 
information contained in the SCAP results proved helpful, but largely because the gaps in 
what was known were being viewed with fear, rather than neutrality or lack of concern.   
A second important element of the SCAP was that the information produced and 
disclosed addressed a real gap in what was known.  The early stages of the financial crisis 
had revealed banks’ internal mechanisms for identifying and assessing risk exposures to be 
deficient, and banks had lost faith in their own capacity to assess the health of 
counterparties.  Subsequent analysis shows that market participants generally knew which 
banks were undercapitalized, but they did not know the size of the shortfalls or the types 
of circumstances that might tip them over the edge.  Providing that information about 
that size, and reducing the variance in market participants’ assessments of bank health 
generally, the stress-test results addressed a gap in the information otherwise available to 
market participants.  Had the Federal Reserve merely provided information that was 
already incorporated into market participants’ assessments of bank health, the value of 
the information content of the stress tests would have been negligible. 
Third, and perhaps most obviously, the value of the information contained in the 
stress test was contingent on market participants’ assessment of the reliability of that 
information.  The importance of credibility was brought home by the European 
experience in their first round of stress tests in 2010. The 2010 European stress tests 
covered 91 banks spanning 20 countries, which in the aggregate held about 65% of the 
total assets in the European banking sector.  In a spirit akin to the U.S. stress tests, 
European authorities declared that “[t]he overall objective of the stress-testing exercise is 
to provide policy information for assessing the resilience of the EU banking system.”4  To 
further this aim, they “decided to disclose a detailed report about the assessment of the 
resilience of the EU banking sector, the key results of the impact of the stress scenarios on 
each individual bank in the exercise, as well as their sovereign exposures, with a detailed 
breakdown between trading and banking book exposures.”5  
Unlike the experience in the United States, however, the disclosure of the results 
of the EU stress tests did not have the desired effect of restoring faith in the health of 
banks and market functioning more generally.  Instead, the evidence available suggest 
that there was virtually no market response to the EU’s disclosures.  (Alves, 2013; Ellahie, 
2012).  Moreover, subsequent adverse developments at a number of the banks that 
received a clean bill of health by the EU authorities suggest that market participants were 
right not to trust the results provided by EU authorities.  At least one of the explanations 
for why the EU provided such rosy results despite the deep problems that clearly persisted 
was that—in contrast to the situation in the United States—regulators had no authority 
to undertake a massive recapitalization should they engage in a truly robust set of stress 
tests and should the results reveal the need for significant additional capital.  Put 
differently, the EU was facing the prospect of setting off a crisis it did not have the 
	
4 ECB Press Release, July 2010. “Questions & Answers: 2010 EU-Wide Stress Testing Exercise” 
at 1.  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/euwidestresstestingexercise-
qaen.pdf?860c12759915bf0e3a8cd5486cb595a4  
5 Id. 
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authority to readily contain if it provided more accurate assessments of the situation, and 
everyone was aware of these limitations.   
This suggests broader lessons.  First, that information generation and disclosure 
are most likely to promote healthy market functioning when market participants are 
filling in information gaps with overly pessimistic assumptions or when, because of 
coordination challenges, liquidity hoarding, or psychological biases, they are excessively 
hesitant to transact.  Significantly, this does not resolve—and may work against—
disclosure when times are good.   The reasons the optimal disclosure policy may be state 
contingent are discussed in more detail by Itay Goldstein and Yaron Leitner in their 
contribution to this handbook and work cited therein.  The considerations here are an 
extension of that already complicated matrix.  (Goldstein & Leitner, 2018; Goldstein and 
Sapra, 2014; Flannery et al., 2017). Whether it is possible to make a change in disclosure 
policy at all is a difficult question, but it is clear that should there be any changes, they 
must go in the direction of more information—not less—as distrust increases.  A related 
issue is that once a crisis takes hold, supervisory reputation is often already diminished, so 
disclosing not only results but also sufficient information to verify those results may be 
necessary for even the informational output to be seen as reliable.  (Schuermann, 2016). 
 A second lesson suggested by the SCAP is that for information injections to be 
useful, the information generated must be otherwise unknown and must be credible.  
Given that there is likely permeability between what markets and governments know, the 
production of the information that is likely to be most useful may well entail the greatest 
risk, in that the process of generating that information might also yield bad news that 
could exacerbate market dysfunction if not accompanied by other stabilizing 
interventions.   
C. Some limitations  
The focus thus far has been on SCAP as a mechanism for producing information.  
But SCAP was never just about producing information.  Another important component 
of the SCAP’s success was the requirement that banks found wanting would be required 
to recapitalize.  Banks had the option of raising private capital if they could or accepting 
capital infusions from Treasury if they could not.  Either way, recapitalizing to a level that 
would allow each, and therefore all, of the largest banks to withstand further losses was 
mandatory.  This was critical to overcoming a collective action problem, as the persistent 
weakness in the banking system had costs beyond those that any individual institution 
internalized as a result of its own undercapitalization.  (Dudley, 2011).  
Given the multiple, interconnected mechanisms through which the SCAP 
promoted recovery, it is difficult to cleanly separate the information it generated from the 
changes it brought about.  These dynamics make it difficult analytically to draw any clean 
conclusions regarding the value of the information SCAP injected into the market in 
improving conditions apart from the other mechanisms through which it aided market 
functioning.  Similar challenges arise with other examples of stress testing during periods 
of distress, like that undertaken by Japan in the 2000s, discussed further below. In these 
and other instances, however, the information generation was critical to tailoring the 
intervention and enabling the intervention to have the desired effect of restoring faith in 
the banks and financial system.  This reflects the distinct challenges and opportunities that 
arise when stress testing after conditions and confidence have already started to 
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deteriorate, but it does not provide a reason to discount the value of information 
production during such periods.  
II. The life of a crisis 
Reviewing the SCAP provides a helpful introduction to why and when just-in-
time information production can serve as a useful crisis-time tool.  This Part expands on 
that introduction by considering the information dynamics over the course of a financial 
crisis, and how stress testing may change what is known at the various stages of a financial 
crisis.  It first considers the background setting, suggesting information gaps are pervasive 
in modern finance.  It then considers, in turn the different ways that stress testing may 
facilitate crisis containment and resolution strategies. Because the Covid-19 crisis is still 
evolving, it is addresses in the implications section that follows this one. 
A. In the beginning, information gaps 
The importance of information generation during a crisis, and the particular type 
of information that a stress test can generate, depends a great deal on background 
information dynamics.  Given space constraints, this chapter will do little more than 
summarize why unknowns loom large in modern finance, and why the import of these 
gaps can change during periods of distress.   
As a starting point, because of the costs of information generation, frictions in the 
transmission of information, and the inherent dynamism of financial markets and the 
economy more generally, market participants and regulators today often operate with 
radically incomplete information. (Awrey & Judge, 2019; Gilson & Kraakman, 2014).  
Complexity is one of the greatest challenges.  Even a cursory evaluation of the complexity 
of the largest banking organizations and the ever-evolving regime of market-based 
intermediation that continues to function alongside and interconnected with the banking 
system supports the view that massive information gaps are the new norm.  (Flood et al., 
2017; Pozsar et al., 2010).  The largest banking organizations often continue to have 
1,000, and sometimes upwards of 2,000, different legal subsidiaries.  Moreover, these 
subsidiaries are often operating different lines of business, in different jurisdictions, and 
subject to oversight by different regulators.  (Carmassi & Herring, 2016).  Instruments too 
remain remarkably complex, and a growing body of literature suggests reasons, from rent 
extraction to excess demand for information-insensitive assets, to expect this complexity 
to continue.  (Hanson & Sunderam, 2013; Holmstrom, 2015; Gorton, 2012).  Simon 
Levin and Andrew Lo voice the view of many in their declaration that “the financial 
system has crossed a threshold of complexity where the system is evolving faster than 
regulators and regulations can keep pace.”6    
Accentuating the challenge and importance of these information gaps is that they 
do not arise arbitrarily, but rather systematically show up in some of the most fragile 
spaces within the overall financial system. A growing body of literature documents the 
demand for assets that holders will hold and trade at face value with minimal due 
diligence into the value of the underlying assets.  The overlapping concepts of “money,” 
“safe assets,” and “information-insensitive assets,” are used to describe assets, of varying 	
6 Levin and Lo, “Opinion: A New Approach to Financial Regulation” at 1 (2015)  	
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maturities, that have this quality (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgenson, 2012; Gorton, 
2016; Holmstrom, 2015).  The commonality across all of these is that the assets play a 
functional role, like facilitating transacting or serving as a tool for liquidity smoothing, 
which means holders are willing to pay a premium for these assets above their risk-
adjusted returns.  Treasuries are a classic example, but when the supply of truly safe assets 
is insufficient relative to the demand, private actors step in to bridge the gap, often using 
structures that are intentionally opaque, like debt on debt, to encourage holders to trade 
without having to worry that anyone else has private information (Dang, Gorton, 
Holmstrom & Ordoñez, 2017).  Information gaps are thus often greatest in precisely the 
domains undertaking the greatest liquidity transformation, making it all the more likely 
that information gaps will be large and will contribute to market dysfunction once holders 
start to ask questions about assets that had previously been treated as safe.  (Judge, 2019; 
Judge, 2017). 
Both the size of information gaps and their distinct importance when things go 
wrong are exacerbated by the constant shape shifting endemic to finance.  Periods of 
stability induce behavior changes that change the structure of the financial system. 
(Minsky, 1992; Shiller, 2001; Geanakoplos, 2010). Regulation also brings about change, 
as market participants constantly seek out new ways to provide desired goods and services 
while minimizing the cost of regulatory compliance.  Innovation, technological and 
otherwise, accentuates these dynamics and introduces an additional force toward change 
by sometimes enabling efficiency gains.  As a result of this dynamism, even if regulators 
were to somehow develop a comprehensive picture of the entire financial system and all 
of the contingent obligations, explicit and otherwise, among the various bodies 
constituting that system, that picture would be outdated before it could be developed.  
Moreover, because regulatory arbitrage is one of the drivers of that shape shifting, 
regulators in particular will almost always be working at an information disadvantage 
when signs of fragility first emerge. 
The importance of all of these dynamics and the ways information gaps can 
exacerbate fragility were on display during the early stages of the last crisis. The aggregate 
value of subprime MBS, for example, was relatively modest, but nonetheless led to 
widespread runs on asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”).  (Covitz et al., 2013).  
ABCP were highly complex in ways that made it hard for holders to verify underlying 
asset quality, and given the low return such effort was almost never cost justified.  The 
patterns of runs on ABCP suggest that some proportion were likely due to a lack of high-
quality information about how subprime assets were allocated across the system and what 
the downgrades of subprime MBS might mean with respect to the value of other 
structured assets.  Moreover, in contrast to the traditional bank setting, where bank 
managers and sometimes bank regulators understood the risks to which a bank was 
exposed, the complexity of the assets underlying many ABCP created a real possibility 
that even plan sponsors had incomplete information about the value of assets underlying 
a structured claim and the waterfall pursuant to which a particular instrument would be 
paid.   
Although the specific series of events leading to the next crisis will inevitably look 
very different, there are broad patterns that do repeat.  Fragilities often arise where 
liquidity transformation (and oftentimes maturity transformation) is taking place, which is 
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often the location in the financial system where assets and institutions have been 
structured to discourage information generation.  Additionally, as economic historian 
Hugh Rockoff has shown, the majority of financial crises in the United States have first 
emerged not in the banking sector, but in that day’s version of a shadow banking system.   
(Rockoff, 2018). Putting these pieces together suggests that that there is a high probability 
that when the next crisis erupts, it will erupt in a space where both private actors and 
public regulators have only incomplete information about the value of assets and how 
risks are allocated.  It further suggests that these information gaps will likely exacerbate 
the dysfunction, and that filling in some of that missing information should be among the 
aims of regulators seeking to contain the fallout.   
This assessment further suggests that even if there are questions about the capacity 
of stress testing to produce novel information when being performed during times of 
peace, they may well remain useful as a crisis-fighting tool.  Because crises so often erupt 
in shadows and in domains where market participants had been relying on assumptions 
or proxies rather than high-quality information, information gaps are often largest in 
precisely those spaces where cracks first begin to appear. 
The post-crisis reforms make modest progress in addressing the challenge of 
information gaps.  There were a number of proposals on the table to substantially reduce 
the size and complexity of financial institutions or to try to scale back significantly on 
market-based finance.  None of these proposals were adopted.  There have been some 
attempts, through mechanisms like the living wills, to scale back on the complexity of 
banks, and there have also been attempts, through efforts like centralized clearing, to 
improve transparency in other domains.  Nonetheless, for the most part, Basel III, the 
Dodd-Frank Act and other post-crisis reforms have not resulted in a massive 
simplification of the financial system, nor have they shut down on the types of dynamism 
that contribute to information gaps.   
Shifting from the nature of the financial system to the rules governing it and the 
institutions through which those rules are implemented and enforced reveals further 
reasons that information gaps are the norm.  Title 12 of the U.S. Code, the provision 
governing banks and banking, is among, if not the, single most complex and convoluted 
areas of law in the United States today.  (Li et al., 2014).  Moreover, as Andrew Haldane 
and others have explained, the post-crisis regulatory regime is even more complex than 
predecessors, leading to new types of uncertainty about how it will operate in different 
states of the world.  (Haldane, 2017).  The regulatory architecture adds to the challenge.  
The United States has long had a particularly fragmented financial regulatory structure, 
one that not only separates the banking regulators from market regulators but also places 
multiple bodies in each of those categories.   
The Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Office of Financial Research 
were intended to overcome some of the information generation challenges that arise from 
this siloed and fragmented regime.  Similarly, the FSOC’s authority to designate nonbank 
financial institutions systemically significant and hence subject to oversight by the Federal 
Reserve was similarly intended to enable the contours of federal prudential oversight to 
morph as institutions otherwise outside that perimeter evolved in ways that could threaten 
the stability of the financial system.  These are helpful developments, but the intervening 
years has revealed them to be fundamentally incomplete.  Other efforts that could help 
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mitigate information gaps, like data standardization, are similarly underway but lack in 
scale and scope relative to what would be needed to meaningful reduce information gaps 
in the financial system. (Berner & Judge, 2019).    
The discussion here is descriptive, not normative.  Given the incredible 
complexity of financial institutions and markets, the rate at which finance continues to 
evolve, and the costs and other frictions that impede information generation, there 
remains large swathes of information that are perfectly knowable and pertinent (at least in 
some states of the world) that are not currently known to any actor, private or public.  
Information gaps are part of finance as it exists today.  Technology may change these 
dynamics, and fintech and regtech are already changing how information is produced 
and disseminated.  Nonetheless, there has yet to be any indication that technology is on 
the verge of overcoming the numerous costs and other frictions that prevent anyone from 
having a complete picture of the financial system, how risks are allocated therein, and the 
myriad mechanisms through which problems in one domain can spread to others. 
B. Stress tests as tool for helping to identify and contain a crisis  
Although sometimes modeled with a single shock, financial crises often grow over 
time.  The crisis had been underway for more than a year when Lehman Brothers failed 
in September 2008.  And as Frederic Mishkin reminded his colleagues in August 2008, 
“in the Great Depression, when . . . something hit the fan, [laughter] it actually occurred 
close to a year after the initial negative shock . . . .  We are now a year into this.”7 
That crises are often underway for a meaningful period of time before things get 
really bad suggests this may be a window of opportunity for brave regulators.  Among the 
key advantages of responding to the soft signals emitted during the early stages of a crisis 
is that those signals, those areas where the market response to news seems 
disproportionate to the news, can serve as a road map for the issues to investigate further.  
As Claudio Borio and co-authors emphasize in their own work explaining why crisis-time 
stress tests are more likely to succeed than peace-time efforts, when “the objective [of a 
stress test] is to support crisis management or resolution, the key risks are often apparent. 
For instance, if the crisis has originated in exposures to property markets, it is natural to 
stress them further.”8   
Borio’s focus, which is helpful, is on the way the early signals of problems can 
provide useful guidance with respect to particular asset classes to watch. Currently, for 
example, there is growing concern about leveraged lending.  A rise in corporate 
bankruptcies or a single corporate bankruptcy with large spillover effects on lending or 
the market for collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) could trigger stress tests focused on 
discerning the capacity of the financial system or firms within it to handle further 
deterioration in those markets.  
Another way early indications of distress may helpfully inform stress testing is by 
identifying what it is that should be tested.  As a number of the other chapters in this 
volume make clear, regulatory stress testing is not limited to banks. It can also be used to 	
7 Mishkin, Statement at 2008 FOMC Meeting at 90 (2008).     
8 Borio, Drehmann, and Tsatsaronis, “Stress-Testing Macro Stress Testing: Does it Live Up to 
Expectations” at 4 (2014). 
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assess the viability of an array of institutional arrangements and, perhaps, the system 
itself.  This type of effort will likely require coordination and communication among 
multiple regulators, but as more is learned about stress testing and techniques continue to 
improve, so too will the range of ways that stress testing might be used early in a crisis to 
provide new information about threats that may be imminent and foreshadowed before 
they become manifest. 
A final point to highlight about stress testing in the face of trouble is that the 
information produced may be helpful not only in identifying specific problem areas, but 
also in forcing market participants and regulators to acknowledge the nature and scope of 
the challenges that could well lie ahead.  Although not talked about much in recent years, 
forbearance and its kin remain a real challenge.  Regulators were not as quick to respond 
to the problems of 2007 as they could have been, and earlier intervention may have 
helped reduce the size of the crisis that followed. (Judge, 2017) 
More to the point, history abounds with examples of regulators being even slower 
to fully acknowledge and address capital deficiencies, with adverse effects on the 
macroeconomy.  The U.S. savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, Japan in the 1990s, and 
Europe emerging out of 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis that followed are just a few 
such examples.  Although less dramatic than widespread panics, allowing a financial 
system to limp along can have disastrous macroeconomic consequences, leading to 
anemic or no growth for extended periods.  Well-conducted stress tests can be a useful 
way to help avoid such situations by forcing an issue—making it plain that there are real 
problems or weaknesses that must be addressed sooner or later.  Put differently, in 
addition to providing information that market participants and regulators appreciate the 
need for, stress tests can also force a change in mindset, compelling recognition that a 
situation may be more severe than anyone wants to admit.  Hence the final section 
examines the value of stress tests after things have stagnated for a while. 
C. Laying the road to recovery after the situation has devolved 
The last section focused on the value of stress testing as an early-stage crisis-
recognition and containment tool.  SCAP represents a somewhat later stage intervention, 
one component of a multi-component, heavy-handed government effort to pave a road to 
recovery in the immediate wake of a panic.  The other pattern that sometimes occurs is 
that regulators succeed in containing or averting a panic but lack the will or means to 
address the underlying problems, leading to a prolonged period of slow growth.  Japan’s 
lost decade (or two) starting in 1991 is a prime example, and one that shows how here 
too, stress testing can be useful.   
The triggering event of Japan’s prolonged malaise was the failure of Toho Sogo 
Bank, which revealed weaknesses that had been building in Japan’s banking system for 
some time. Signs of trouble had emerged earlier, but a combination of wishful thinking 
and forbearance made it easier for banks to be too slow in recognizing losses.  After first 
facilitating this wishful thinking by expanding deposit insurance and helping shield banks 
from market discipline, the government began to recognize a different tack was needed.  
The government started to intervene in more meaningful ways by injecting capital into 
jusen, specialized, nonbank housing loan companies, in 1995 and 1996.  This was followed 
by a much more aggressive round of capital injections into banks in 1998.  Even as 
regulators began to tackle the problem of capital deficiencies, unrecognized losses, and 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3633310
	 13 
the need for more significant government intervention, however, they continued, for a 
while, to rely on banks’ own, overly rosy assessments of their balance sheets.   
It was not until the early 2000s, when the government stopped accepting the 
banks’ assessments of their health and future capital needs and instead started 
undertaking their own, more accurate and more dire, assessments of bank loans’ likely 
performance.  Like the SCAP, this horizontal, supervisory exercise provided valuable new 
insights into where problems lied and what needed to be done to address them.  Armed 
with these new insights, Japanese regulators finally forced banks to restructure or 
otherwise address troubled loans, thereby cleaning up the latent problems that had so 
long plagued the system and paving the way for future growth.     
As with the SCAP, the production of more reliable information about the size and 
location of weaknesses was produced in conjunction with an effort to address those 
challenges, making it difficult to separate the value of the information production from 
the substantive actions.  That the government had previously provided significant 
financial support without simultaneously compelling information production, and that 
such efforts failed to revive the system, nonetheless suggests that high-quality information 
is often a prerequisite to successfully bringing about a lasting inflection point once 
systemic distress takes hold.  
Japan’s lost decade also serves as a pointed reminder of the way information gaps 
can feed into tendencies to engage in forbearance and wishful thinking, patterns that can 
have lasting and detrimental effects on a country’s economic health.  In the face of 
stagnation or other indicators that a country’s financial system is not performing as well 
as it could, targeted, forward-looking information generation could serve a helpful role in 
identifying the sites that require further attention and increasing confidence in those that 
do not.   
Japan’s experience is thus another illustration of the importance of accurate 
information about the location and size of losses in efforts to revitalize an ailing financial 
system.  It is different in the sense that the production of information came far later into 
the crisis, when the situation was stable but still bleak.  The role of the information was 
thus not to avoid runs by short-term creditors, but rather the information proved critical 
to breaking the feedback loop between the economy and financial system that was 
weighing heavily on both.   
III. Setting the Stage for Success: Covid-19 and beyond 
The analysis thus far has explored the value of just-in-time information 
production when crisis hits. During the early stages of a crisis, stress testing and related 
modes of information production can help regulators and others to recognize the 
magnitude of the change in state they are facing.  As a crisis evolves, appropriately 
designed stress tests can provide valuable information about the actual capital deficiencies 
in the system.  Stress tests can also be used to identify institutions that ought to be closed 
or even entire segments of the market that should be phased out. Furthermore, stress tests 
could be designed to identify interconnections or other mechanisms of contagion that 
must be addressed to restore calm. Depending on the stage produced, these types of 
information can also facilitate engagement, allowing legislatures and the public to provide 
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more informed feedback, processes that can be critical to the legitimacy and public 
acceptance of the crisis management process.   
This part first uses the lessons here to provide an early-stage assessment of the 
Fed’s approach to stress testing in response to Covid-19. It then provides some general 
thoughts on the steps that ought to be taken to facilitate information generation during 
periods of systemic distress. 
A. Covid-19 
Covid-19 is a distinct type of crisis in many ways. The rapidity with which it hit 
the real economy and the speed with which both financial regulators, led by the Fed, and 
Congress responded with fiscal and other support are unprecedented. That so few were 
on the lookout for a global pandemic is itself a powerful illustration of why crisis-time 
stress testing will always be critical. There is simply no way that central banks can foresee 
in advance the array of exigencies that could threaten the health of banks and the 
broader financial system they help constitute. 
Given the prompt response and the relative success of many of the efforts to stop 
widespread panic and contain the economic damage inflicted, it may be easy to think that 
the economic crisis will not morph into a financial one. But both the public health and 
economic crisis are still evolving, and the threat those developments pose to banks and 
other parts of the financial system remains far from clear.  
Thus far, the U.S. response has been decidedly mixed. In contrast to the United 
Kingdom, for example, the United States went forward with the stress tests when 
scheduled in the spring of 2020. But having recently made changes that incorporated the 
results of the stress tests into banks’ capital requirements, the Fed opted to proceed with 
stress test scenarios that had been developed before the global pandemic took hold. The 
result was that even the severely adverse scenario contained assumptions that mapped 
poorly onto the dramatic pace of the contraction in global economic activity throughout 
the spring of 2020. It chose to complement those stress tests with “sensitivity analyses” 
that seek to capture how banks will perform in one of three possible scenarios—a quick 
return to economic health (V shape), a more prolonged downturn before returning to 
economic health (U shape), or a double dip recession (the dreaded W). But it is not 
running a full stress test for any of the banks using those scenarios. Moreover, the Fed’s 
Vice Chair for Supervision, Randal Quarles, recently announced that the Fed is not 
planning to release the results of these sensitivity analyses for any specific bank. Rather, it 
will release only aggregate results. 
The analysis here suggests that the Fed was wise to proceed with the stress tests 
and to complement the original scenarios with sensitivity analyses designed to provide 
insight into how banks may fare under some of the, quite different, possible economic 
scenarios. Running these additional analyses should provide the Fed more insight into 
which firms are most likely to run into trouble and it may also help reveal sources of 
weakness or mechanisms of contagion that may not have been visible otherwise. Banks 
too should have better insight into the preparedness for what lies ahead, allowing them to 
plan accordingly. 
At the same time, the analysis here also suggests that the Fed’s response thus far 
has been far from sufficient. One of the reasons for not releasing individualized sensitivity 
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analysis results, according to Quarles, is that these analyses are far less rigorous than the 
Fed’s typical stress testing, raising questions about just how accurate the results and what 
they might miss. Moreover, the refusal to provide information about how individual 
banks are expected to fare could yet stoke fear among bank creditors, including 
counterparties and depositors. Even if there is no immediate run, should any individual 
banks report results that raise red flags, market participants may become concerned about 
what else the Fed may be trying to hide by only providing aggregate results.  
The Fed’s decision to make only minor modification to its stress tests despite the 
onslaught of a global pandemic that changes so much is a sign that the Fed has not yet 
fully embraced the need to be responsive in the face of changed circumstances. On the 
whole, the Fed has been far more quick to roll out new programs and shift to a more 
accommodative approach to monetary policy than it was in 2007 and 2008. Nonetheless, 
staying ahead of a crisis requires good information. The Fed has not taken all the steps it 
could to understand bank vulnerabilities in the face of Covid-19, and there is limited 
evidence that it is working as closely as it could be with other financial regulators, other 
than Treasury, to identify other potential sources of systemic weakness. More can and 
should be done. 
B. Limited Safety Net 
“If the primary objective [of a stress test] is to support crisis management and 
resolution, system-wide public-sector liquidity and capital backstops are essential. Without 
them, no exercise can be credible.”9  This declaration from Claudio Borio, Mathias 
Drehmann and Kostas Tsatsaronis reveals an important even if unstated assumption:  
Regulators are going to be rationally hesitant to produce information that could 
exacerbate an already fragile situation unless they have the tools in hand to contain the 
fallout their findings might trigger. Crises are in part information events.  Bad news is 
often the trigger that leads to runs.  It is unrealistic to ask financial regulators to produce 
timely information when the very process of doing so might trigger the crisis they are 
seeking to avoid.  Hence, the most important policy take-away is that there must be safety 
nets specifically designed or otherwise able to accommodate the adverse systemic 
ramifications that could flow should the stress tests produce bad news about the state of 
the financial system or elements thereof.    
A policy of nondisclosure might seem like a solution.  After all, bad news must 
reach the market to trigger a market response. Given the long history of confidentiality in 
bank supervision, there may be some room for bank supervisors to expand their activities 
to produce some new types of information without that information getting out.  Precisely 
because banks are so heavily regulated, however, the most pressing information gaps are 
unlikely to be information pertinent just to the health of individual banking organizations.  
And if the signals indicating a change in state reveal information gaps with respect to 
other sectors of the market, it is doubtful that bank supervisors will have the ability to 
devise a new form of stress test or related mode of information production without market 
participants getting a whiff that something is going on.  Particularly given that for any 
exercise to be helpful, it will likely require significant information from and participation 	
9 Borio, Drehmann, and Tsatsaronis, “Stress-Testing Macro Stress Testing: Does it Live Up to 
Expectations” at 10 (2014). 
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by the relevant financial institutions, the observation from Borio and colleagues seems 
apt: We cannot expect regulators to have the courage to produce new and potentially 
quite scary information with the hope that the information will not leak and that failure to 
disclose will not itself trigger concern. 
This creates a very real chicken-or-egg problem.  Information is key to developing 
a plan for crisis management, but regulators will have a hard time producing the 
information they need to develop a plan without first having meaningful support 
mechanisms already in place.  This problem is accentuated by a structural problem, 
common to the United States and many most democratic systems, that legislative 
approval—that is, approval by a diverse group of nonfinancial experts who are elected by 
the people—is required before the government can provide lasting fiscal support, like 
capital injections.  So this is the rub: How can regulators provide elected officials 
meaningful information about the location of weaknesses in the system and the threats 
that those weaknesses pose when the very process of producing that information could 
trigger the crisis they want to avert? 
Regulators have found ways to try to navigate around these challenges, but all 
have limits and each can raise concerns regarding regulatory overreach. For example, 
most central banks have the ability to provide liquidity support to banks and sometimes 
nonbanks.  But because the run point for firms (and the financial system) is breached well 
before firms become insolvent, liquidity support alone is insufficient to deter runs and 
restore stability in most instances.  There is also the possibility that the bad news 
produced in a stress test might limit a central banks’ legal authority to provide support 
where it is most needed.  This practical challenge is not new.  It has at times led to central 
banks stretching the bounds of their legal authority.  It has also led to uninformed 
“emergency legislation” pursuant to which a legislature grants exceptionally broad 
authority to regulators to use their discretion to address the problem. Although either 
mechanism can overcome the need for legislative approval, neither suffices to achieve the 
type of broad-based buy-in that a legislative check is designed to provide and which can 
be critical to minimizing popular backlash.   
There have been a number of post-crisis reform proposals that would help address 
this challenge.  Eric Posner, for example, has argued that the authority of the Federal 
Reserve should be expanded to include recapitalizations under appropriate 
circumstances.  (Posner, 2017).  The analysis suggests an additional advantage of such a 
reform: If regulators have the standing authority needed to address really bad news, they 
might be more willing to undertake innovative new forms of stress testing that are 
responsive to the crisis they are facing.  The challenge—which is deeply rooted in the 
structure of the U.S. and other governments—is that such overt fiscal authority is hard to 
reconcile with the independence traditionally enjoyed by central banks, and central banks 
may well lose that independence if given such overt fiscal authority. (Tucker, 2018).   
In other work, I propose trying to address this challenge by trying to separate 
crisis containment from crisis resolution. The aim here is to give regulators broad 
authority to take the actions needed to stabilize the financial system and absorb the 
shocks of further bad news while still protecting the legislature’s prerogative to have a 
voice in how best to achieve lasting stability.   One way to achieve this type of balance 
would be to vest the finance ministry, such as the U.S. Treasury Secretary, with broad, 
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time-limited guarantee authority.  By allowing the Treasury Secretary to guarantee any 
debt claims, without pretending to know whether the underlying assets suffice to cover the 
claim, the guarantee regime would aim to keep private capital in the system while 
regulators produce the information needed to identify and address weaknesses.  This 
approach would have the advantage of enabling regulators to undertake stress testing and 
other just-in-time information production anywhere in the financial system, even if those 
problems arise in domains other than banks or other entities subject to prudential 
oversight.   
Appropriately structured, such a regime might go beyond enabling crisis-time 
stress testing to, in effect, mandating it.  In placing an outside limit of two years on the 
duration of any guarantee scheme and requiring regulators to provide Congress a 
detailed report of where problems exist and how they should be best addressed, an 
emergency guarantee regime could also incent crisis-time information production.  Given 
how often regulators are slow to recognize the magnitude of the problems they are facing, 
this could be a distinct and related benefit of such a regime. This type of approach has 
numerous risks and challenges, including the inevitable moral hazard concerns that arise 
from government intervention and legitimate concerns about vesting too much authority 
in a Treasury Secretary beholden to the President.  Nonetheless, starting with a realistic 
baseline of where things now stand, and recognizing the importance of producing new 
information once distress sets in and the practical challenges impeding regulators’ 
willingness to produce such information suggests the benefits may outweigh the costs. 
(Judge, 2017) 
Regardless of the approach taken, the inability to expect regulators to produce 
timely information about fragilities in the financial system without some capacity to 
address the fallout that information would trigger exemplifies what John Crawford has 
labeled the “moral hazard paradox of safety nets.”10  If the chicken of broad 
recapitalization authority must precede information production about how that authority 
ought best be used, legislatures will likely have to provide much broader authority and 
impose fewer checks on how it is used than if regulators could first produce an egg in the 
form of information about the location and size of losses in the system.   
The success of the SCAP and the Japan’s experience in the mid-2000s illustrates 
other ways that just-in-time information production brings this paradox to life.  Whether 
the government provides broader support than is necessary or market participants run on 
more firms than the actual weaknesses would justify, indiscriminate behavior is at the 
center of crises and is a major factor contributing to the concerns about moral hazard 
that crisis responses so often trigger.  Crisis-time stress tests can produce critical, credible 
information about the location of weaknesses and the mechanisms via which they might 
propagate dysfunction.  With such information in hand, market participants can tailor 
their responses, resulting in less widespread dysfunction, and regulators can better tailor 
their responses, resulting in fewer concerns about moral hazard.  But none of these 
benefits can be realized if regulators are too afraid to produce that information, and 
without more authority to contain the fallout of bad news, there are reasons to expect that 
the frequency and rigor of crisis-time stress tests will be far below the level that is optimal.  	
10 Crawford, “The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets” (2015).  
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C. Preparing 
Financial crises, like war, require lots of advanced planning, and a willingness to 
revise those plans and toss them out completely in the face of better information or 
evolving circumstances.  Thus the final broad point to highlight is that even though 
successful crisis-time stress testing will likely require some creativity and willingness to 
respond to the unique exigencies of the circumstances posed, there are steps that can be 
taken in advance to enhance the institutional capacity of the financial regulatory system 
to engage in successful crisis-time stress testing.  Two areas where advanced effort could 
help merit particular attention. 
1. Regulatory coordination 
That weaknesses may well first appear outside the formally regulated banking 
sector has important implications for the tools that will be needed for regulators to 
undertake appropriate just-in-time information production.  Recall, the fragmented 
regulatory structure was among the features of the U.S. financial system that was changed 
only modestly after the crisis.  Moreover, the DNA of the various regulators has not 
changed in any fundamental ways.  The market regulators now have seats on the FSOC 
and a voice in crafting specific rules that are meant to address systemic stability, but their 
missions remain largely focused on protecting investors, combatting fraud, and facilitating 
capital formations—aims that are often orthogonal and sometimes contrary to effective 
crisis management.  As reflected in the contentiousness and months of delay that 
characterized efforts for the Federal Reserve and Securities Exchange Commission to 
enter into a memorandum of understanding for sharing information once Bear failed and 
for the Fed to open two liquidity facilities to primary dealers subject to SEC oversight, 
crises cannot be trusted to produce kumbaya moments in which regulators magically 
overlook their differences and prerogatives for the sake of the collective good.  In part 
because each often believes in the righteousness of their mission, and in part because no 
one has a view of the whole system and hence how weaknesses in one domain might spill 
over to others, effective coordination remains challenging. 
In the United States, the creation of the FSOC makes some useful headway on 
these challenges.  The regular meetings of the FSOC, for example, provide a setting for 
the heads of all of the federal financial agencies and some state representatives to get to 
know each other in an environment that does not have the stressful overlay that a crisis 
induces.  These meetings and the requirement that each member of FSOC attest to the 
completeness of the annual report that FSOC must provide Congress outlining potential 
threats to systemic stability also serves the useful function of ensuring that all of the 
regulators stay attuned to the possibility of a systemic event and consider whether other 
developments within the domain of their agency might have systemic repercussions that 
they might not otherwise have ignored.  The OFR is similarly helpful in theory, given its 
broad authority to collect and standardize data and its orientation toward addressing 
systemic risk, but it is not currently on course to become a powerful mechanism for 
generating timely information not otherwise known about the health and structure of the 
financial system.  A number of other countries have gone further.  The United Kingdom, 
for example, has formed a Financial Policy Committee and vested it with a range of 
complementary tools, including stress testing, to try to prevent, detect, and contain 
systemic disruptions. 
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Nonetheless, particularly in jurisdictions like the United States where the 
regulatory regime remains exceptionally fragmented, further progress in promoting 
coordination, communication and trust among today’s very different financial regulators 
could go a long way to enhancing their capacity to work well together when indications of 
fragility again arise.  The more this is embedded deeply into these organizations—such 
that it is not just the heads but long-time employees who are likely to remain with an 
agency through changing leadership—the more likely it is that they will have the good 
will and common language needed to work productively even when facing new 
challenges.  One way to do this would be through regulatory overhaul, but more modest 
steps could also be useful.  Of particular relevance to this volume, regular stress testing 
that requires the involvement of multiple regulators may be one way to help forge these 
relationships.  Working together during peace times to undertake macroprudential stress 
tests, for example, could help regulators develop shared understandings of how others 
approach data and testing issues in ways that may make it far easier to devise and 
implement crisis-specific stress tests when the time comes. 
2. Skills and credibility  
Another factor that will impact the capacity of regulators to design and undertake 
stress tests during periods of systemic distress is whether they already possess the relevant 
skill set.  The spread of stress testing as a crisis preparedness and avoidance tool will likely 
help in this regard.  Banks and their regulators are growing increasingly accustomed to, 
and seemingly sophisticated about, the process of conducting stress tests, improving the 
quality and reliability of the information they generate.  As other chapters in this volume 
explain, other types of firms, like clearing houses, and other regulators, like the CFTC, 
are also starting to use stress tests with greater frequency, and could productively increase 
their use further for reasons apart from those addressed here.  (Berner, Cechetti & 
Schoenholtz, 2019).  Similarly, advances in macroeconomic stress testing and other 
innovative new forward-looking assessments of the capacity of firms, market structures, or 
the financial system, to bear particular types of adverse developments could further 
expand the tools readily available to regulators, even if they then must be deployed in 
ways that address the particular types of risks that emerging threats make more likely.   
That said, the spread of stress testing as a peace time tool may be a mixed 
blessing.  One of the reasons that the SCAP was so successful was that it employed a new 
technique for producing seemingly credible information about the health of large 
financial institutions and their capacity to withstand further adverse developments.  Put 
differently, the information produced in the SCAP was credible in part because the 
accompanying disclosures allowed market participants to engage in some degree of 
verification, but also because the process looked different than the supervisory oversight 
that had proved wanting.   
Once stress testing, with disclosure, is the norm, then the process itself can be 
tainted and discredited.  The same regulators, running effectively the same stress tests but 
with some tweaks to address new information, are not likely to produce information that 
the market will see as credible when earlier stress testing had provided overly rosy 
assessments.  The efforts by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO) to conduct risk-based capital stress tests for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac prior 
to the crisis bring this challenge to life.  The failure of those stress tests to reveal problems 
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that later became evident had been there for some time, and had been disguised rather 
than uncovered by OFHEO’s stress tests, discredited both the techniques OFHEO used 
and OFHEO, itself.  An autopsy of that failure by Scott Frame and co-authors 
demonstrates that errors with respect to model estimation frequency and specification and 
reliance on an insufficiently adverse house price scenario contributed to a stress test that 
was considered “state of the art” when implemented becoming a “spectacular failure.”11 
To be sure, there were specific flaws in the OFHEO program that reduced its 
efficacy and there have been attempts to learn from those mistakes.  But, as the stress tests 
of Iceland’s banking system reflect, this was not an isolated failure.  (Borio et al., 2014).  
Stress testing will inevitably remain a work in progress, and will inevitably at times 
produce assessments that underestimate growing risks.  When this happens, tweaking 
assumptions will not suffice to restore faith in the process or outcomes.  Thus, while 
regular stress testing on the whole is a positive development, one that reduces information 
gaps and expands the skill set of regulators to produce valuable information, further 
attention to these dynamics may be warranted to try to address the ways that loss of 
regulatory credibility may exacerbate crises, creating yet more of a need for information 
market participants can trust while reducing the capacity of regulators to provide it.  
(Morrison & White, 2013). 
Conclusion 
 
When any crisis hits, regulators and market participants will inevitably lack some 
of the information that the events triggering the crisis reveal to be important. These 
information gaps can exacerbate market dysfunction and slow, and otherwise impede, 
appropriate regulatory response. Early in a crisis, stress testing can help compel 
regulators, as well as politicians and market participants, to acknowledge that they may 
be facing a bigger threat than they realize, leading to earlier intervention. After a crisis 
has taken hold, stress tests can provide helpful guidance about the location and size of 
capital deficiencies or other weaknesses impeding market functioning, allowing more 
tailored government interventions. Both dynamics may yet be important in connection 
with containing the fallout from Covid-19. 
Stress test can also provide market participants credible information that 
underlying problems have been addressed or that the government has a plan for 
rectifying, further facilitating market functioning. However, none of the advantages that 
crisis-time stress testing can confer will be realized unless there is an adequate backstop in 
place to handle the fallout if the tests produce bad news. Time-limited guarantees, 
coupled with an appropriate affirmative investigation and reporting obligations, might be 
one way to incent and enable information production when it is most needed.   
Regardless of whether such a step is taken, regulators should be on guard not to 
allow the results of stress tests or other supervisory efforts to make them too confident 
about the health of the financial system or institutions within it. This is one of the most 
critical lessons. The world is constantly evolving, and the financial system is shape shifting 	
11 Frame, Gerardi, and Willen, “The Failure of Supervisory Stress Testing: Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and OFHEO” at 2 (2015).   	
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faster than many domains.  No test can fully reveal the vagaries of the interplays through 
which an unexpected adverse development can trigger effects elsewhere in the system.  
Looking out for and responding to soft signals that something might be amiss and being 
willing to ask hard questions can go a long way in helping regulators identify and address 
a crisis before it topples the entire economy.  
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